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How does the formation of a free trade area or customs union affect the distribution
of activity within the area?  Are the gains (or losses) divided between members, or do
some gain while others lose? Do the real incomes of member countries tend to converge
or  diverge?  The European experience has been of convergence, with  lower  income
countries succeeding in narrowing the gap in per capita incomes between them and the
high income center.  But a number of regional agreements between developing countries
have been associated with divergence of economic performance (for example in the East
African Common Market, the Central American Common Market, and the Economic
Community of West Africa).
In this paper we use two strands of research to address these issues.  First, we
show how the comparative advantage of member countries, relative to  each other and
relative to the rest of the world, provides a basis for predicting who gains and who loses.
Typically the country in the free trade agreement (FTA) that has comparative advantage
most different from the world average is most at risk from trade diversion.  Thus, if a
group of low income countries form an FTA, there will be  a tendency for the lowest
income members to suffer real income loss due to trade diversion. In contrast, if an FTA
contains a high income country (relative to other members and to the world average) then
lower income members are likely to converge with the high income partner.
The second strand of research analyses the importance of agglomeration forces,
which tend to lead to the spatial clustering of activities.  We argue that the tendency for
these forces to lead to large concentrations of economic activity will be more pronounced
iin FTAs amongst low income countries than for those containing high income countries.
This will be a further force for divergence of income levels in developing country FTAs.
Taking these arguments together, our main conclusions are that there are economic
reasons for thinking that an FTA between developing countries might lead to divergence
of their income levels, with the richer countries benefiting at the expense of the poorer.
However,  FTAs  that  contain  high  income  members  are  more  likely  to  lead  to
convergence of income levels.  These results suggest that developing countries are likely
to be better served by 'north-south' than by 'south-south' free trade agreements.
ii1. Introduction:
How does the formation of a free trade area or customs union affect the distribution
of activity within the area?  Are the gains (or losses) divided between members, or do
some gain while others lose?  Do the real incomes of member countries tend to converge
or diverge?  The standard theory of economic integration (from Viner (1950) onwards)
tells us that the effects of membership are ambiguous, but gives little guidance on the
answers to these questions.'
In this paper we use two strands of research to address these questions.  The first
involves identifying underlying characteristics of economies that make them more or less
prone to trade creation or trade diversion.  In particular, we  look at the comparative
advantage of member countries, relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world,
and show how this provides a basis for predicting who gains and who loses.  Typically
the country in the free trade area (FTA) that has comparative advantage most different
from the world average is most at risk from trade diversion.  Thus, if a  group of low
income countries form an FTA, there will be a tendency for the lowest income members
to suffer real income loss due to trade diversion.  In contrast, if an FTA contains a high
income country (relative to other members and to the world average) then lower income
members are likely to converge with the high income partner.
The second strand of research analyses the importance of agglomeration forces,
which tend to lead to the spatial clustering of activities.  We argue that the tendency for
these forces to lead to large concentrations of economic activity will be more pronounced
in FTAs amongst low income countries than for those containing high income countries.
This will be a further force for divergence of income levels in developing country FTAs.
ITaking these arguments together, our main conclusions are that there are economic
reasons for thinking that an FTA between developing countries might lead to divergence
of their income levels, with the richer countries benefiting at the expense of the poorer.
However,  FTAs  that  contain  high  income  members  are  more  likely  to  lead  to
convergence rather than divergence of income levels.  There is therefore  a  case for
developing countries to forge trade links with high income countries.
Our analytical arguments about the effects of FTAs are consistent with  at least
some experiences of convergence and divergence within FTAs.  The experience of the
European Union  is  one of  considerable convergence of per  capita income  levels of
member countries.  The historical record from 1947 (when the BeNeLux Customs Union
was created), through 1957 (creation of the EEC), 1968 (when internal tariffs were finally
eliminated) and to the early 1980s is studied by Ben-David (1993).  He finds that per
capita income differences narrowed more or less steadily, falling by about two thirds over
the period, due mainly to more rapid growth of the lower income countries. 2 The most
interesting features of the more recent experience are the strong performance of Ireland,
Spain and Portugal, which have made substantial progress in closing the gap with richer
members of the EU.  Whereas in the mid 1980s these countries' per capita incomes were,
respectively, 61%, 49% and 27% of the income of the large EU countries', by the late
1990s the numbers had risen to 91%, 67% and 38%.
The experience of a number of developing country FTAs paints a very different
picture,  and  suggests  some  instances  at  least  in  which  integration  has  promoted
divergence.  Perhaps the  best  documented example of  this  is  the  concentration  of
manufacturing  in  the  old  East  African  Common  Market.  Uganda  and  Tanzania
2contended that all the gains of East African Common Market were going to Kenya, which
in the  1960s steadily enhanced its  position as the  industrial center of  the Common
Market,  producing  more  than  70%  of  the  manufactures and  exporting  a  growing
percentage of them to its two relatively less developed partners.  The Common Market
collapsed in 1977 as it failed to satisfy the poorer members that they were getting a fair
share  of  the  gains.  More  recent  examples  include  the  concentration  of  industry,
commerce and services in and around Guatemala City and San Salvador in the Central
American  Common Market, and Abidjan and Dakar in the Economic Community of
West Africa.  Guatemala and El Salvador now account for over 80% of manufacturing
value added in the Central American Common Market, up from 68% in 1980. And in the
Economic Community of West Africa the combined share of Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal
in manufacturing value added has risen from 55% in 1972 to 71% in 1997.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we
develop the  relationship between trade  diversion and  the  comparative advantage of
members of an FTA.  We do this by developing some simple examples and by drawing
on more technical material from Venables (1999).  Section 3 discusses the agglomeration
arguments, and section 4 concludes.
2:  Trade creation and trade diversion:
Internal and external comparative advantage
The classic analysis of the real income effects of membership in an FTA is that of
Viner  (1950),  who  established  the  ideas  of  trade  creation  and  trade  diversion.
Membership in an FTA changes the sources from which products are supplied to member
3country markets, increasing supply from the partner countries as these receive preferential
treatment, but possibly also reducing supply from domestic production and from the rest
of the world.  To the extent that overall supply is increased and lower cost imports from
the partner country replace higher cost (previously protected) domestic production, we
expect the welfare gains of trade creation. However, to the extent that increased imports
from  partner  countries  displace  lower  cost  imports  from  the  rest  of  the  world  (a
possibility that arises because of the preferential treatment of partner imports) then the
country experiences the welfare loss of trade diversion.
To link these forces to the characteristics of member countries we need to look at
the comparative advantage of these countries relative to each other and relative to the rest
of the world.  Let us start by thinking through an example of two developing economies
that both have a comparative disadvantage in manufactures relative to the rest of the
world, but the disadvantage is less for one of them than the other. Kenya and Uganda can
serve as examples.  Their comparative disadvantage in manufactures could come from
many alternative sources - technological, geographical or institutional differences - but
let us suppose that it is because of low endowments of human capital: Kenya has little
human capital per worker relative to the world average, and Uganda has even less.  The
initial position is one in which both Kenya and Uganda have some manufacturing (which
we suppose is human capital intensive), serving local consumers and surviving because of
high tariff protection.
What  happens  if  these  two  countries  form  an  FTA?  Since  Kenya  has  a
comparative advantage in manufacturing (relative to Uganda, but not relative to the rest
of the world), it will draw manufacturing production out of Uganda, so consumers in both
4countries  will  be  supplied  with  manufactures  from  Kenya.  This  moves  Kenya's
production structure further away from its comparative advantage (relative to the world at
large), while moving Uganda's  closer.  What are the effects of this on real  income?
Surprisingly, Kenya  will gain from  the  relocation, and Uganda  may  lose  (and  will
certainly do less well than Kenya).  The reason is that Uganda is suffering trade diversion
- some manufactures that were previously imported from the rest of the world are now
imported  from  Kenya.  But  for  Kenya,  there  are gains  from  being  able  to  supply
manufactures to the Ugandan market, protected from competition with the rest of the
world.
This argument focuses just on manufactures.  Are there not forces cutting in the
opposite direction for other sectors, such as agriculture, offsetting the argument?  Just as
Kenya  expands  its  manufacturing  production  and  exports,  so  Uganda  expands  its
agriculture.  However, given the initial comparative advantage of these countries they are
both exporting agriculture to the rest of the world, so trade diversion does not arise.
This simple example makes the point that it is possible to relate the distribution of
the gains and losses to the comparative advantage of member countries - compared to
each other and to the rest of  the world.  And in this  example, the country with  the
comparative advantage most different from the rest of the world is the loser (Uganda).
Intuitively, a  country  suffers a  lot  of trade  diversion if  its  partner has  comparative
advantage which comes between it and the rest of the world.
5A Ricardian example
A rigorous argument - albeit for a very special case - is made on figure 1.  There
are two goods, X and Y, and three countries, a large rest of the world (country 0), and two
small countries, (1 and 2).  The figure has on the axes quantities of goods X and Y, and
we  assume  (for  simplicity)  that  consumption  of  the  goods  takes  place  in  fixed
proportions, along the consumption line illustrated.  The world price of good Y in terms
of X ispo.
Production possibilities for countries 1 and 2 are illustrated by the solid lines XY 1
and XY 2. The levels of these lines are unimportant, so they are all constructed to  go
through the same point X on the vertical axis, and we also draw a world price line (XYO)
through this point.  The slopes of the lines do matter, since they measure the rate of
transformation  between  goods.  The figure  is  constructed  such  that  country  1  has
comparative advantage in good X relative to world prices, p., but not relative to country
2.  Country 2 has a comparative advantage in good X relative to both country 1 and the
rest of the world.  (These comparative advantages can be seen by comparing Y, with YO
andY 2).
In the initial situation all countries have a tariff at ad valorem rate t on all imports.
What is the pattern of trade? Imports of good Y from the rest of the world will have price
po(I + t), which is the slope of the dotted line.  At these prices country 2 specializes in
good X  and imports good Y.  Its internal price  ratio is therefore po(l  + t),  and  its
consumption is point A2;  although internal decisions are governed by price ratio po(l + t)
the  terms  of  trade  are pO and  government  revenue is  being earned,  this  financing
6consumption at A 2. In contrast, country 1 does not trade.  Given the tariff rate on imports
of Y, it is cheaper to produce them domestically than import them;  and it does not pay to
export them, since it would receive only  po per unit, not po(l + t).  Its price is pi, between
po and po(l + t), and since it is not trading, its consumption is at point A,.
Now,  consider the effects of an FTA between countries 1 and 2.  Since trade
between countries I and 2 is tariff free they will have the same price ratio, and this will
be somewhere between the initial prices in the two countries (i.e. between po(l  + t) and
pi).  It is illustrated.  by price ratio p*, the slope of the dashed lines. 4 At this price ratio
country 1 specializes in good X and country 2 in good Y;  they trade with each other (and
not with the rest of the world), and consume at points B, and B2. We see that country I
gains (consumption goes from A, to B 1) and country 2 loses (consumption goes from and
A2 to B2) from formation of the FTA.
There are several messages from this figure.  First, country 1 experiences trade
creation; it is able to exploit its comparative advantage (relative to country 2) and reap
some gains from trade that it was not getting in the original position.  These gains arise
despite the fact that country l's  production structure has moved in the opposite direction
from the way it would have had it gone under full free trade.  In contrast, country 2
suffers trade diversion;  its production structure has not changed, but it is now getting its
imports of Y at price p *, which is less than the private cost of importing from the rest of
the world, po(l + t), but greater than the social cost, po.
Second,  the losing  country  - country  2 - is the  one with  comparative  advantage
most different from that of the rest of the world.  The intuition is as we saw in our Kenya/
Uganda example above.  The outlier has little scope for trade creation - it was trading in
7the  initial  situation.  However,  freeing up  trade  with  a  country  with  comparative
advantage between it and the rest of the world is exactly the sort of circumstance in which
trade diversion is likely.  The general argument here is that countries with comparative
advantage closer to the world average do better in an FTA than do countries with more
extreme comparative  advantage.  Interposing the  'intermediate'  country between the
'extreme'  one and the rest of the world distorts the extreme country's trade, causing it to
switch import supplier.  But the intermediate country does not experience this switch in
supply;  its trade with the 'extreme' country and with the rest of the world are less close
substitutes, and therefore less vulnerable to trade diversion.
Resultsfrom  a model
A more general analysis of these issues requires a model in which  (unlike the
Ricardian model of the preceding subsection) countries do not completely specialize and
all countries trade both within the FTA and externally.  Such a model is developed and
analysed in Venables (1999), and here we just illustrate some of the main points from it.
The model is a generalization of a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, and assumes that all
countries have the same technology and have different endowments of two factors, which
we refer to as skilled and unskilled labour, S and U.  There are three countries one of
which - the rest of the world - is large, and is endowed with equal quantities of these two
factors. 5 Countries 1 and 2 may have factor endowments different from each other and
from the rest  of the world, and  these differences are the basis  of their  comparative
advantage.
8Each country can produce three goods.  One is a non-tradable, and uses S and U
symmetrically (so has isoquants symmetric around the 450 line).  The other two  are
tradable, and use S and U in different proportions.  Each of these goods is differentiated
by location of production - an Armington assumption.  We impose this primarily for
computational convenience, and set the amount of product differentiation at a minimal
level -- the elasticity of substitution between products from different locations is 50 in the
examples that follow.  Also, for ease of interpretation, we impose symmetry between the
two tradable products, assuming that they take the same share in consumption, and that
the factor intensity of one industry is the reciprocal of that in the other industry.
The model is constructed such that prices in the rest of the world are unity, and
this we take to be the world price ratio, held constant in all experiments.  In the initial
equilibrium all of the imports of countries 1 and 2 face the same tariff rate, regardless of
source or commodity type. The internal price ratios and trade patterns of countries 1 and
2 reflect these tariffs and each country's factor abundance.  The experiment we study is
the removal of the tariff between countries 1 and 2;  we want to  see how outcomes
depend on the endowments of the two countries, relative to each other and to the rest of
the world.
Results are illustrated on figure 2, the axes of which give the country 1 and 2
factor endowments, expressed as deviations from unity.  Thus, point 0 on the horizontal
axis corresponds to a point where S2= U2 =  1, giving country 2 the same endowment ratio
as the rest of the world.  To the right of this country 2 becomes S abundant and U scarce.
As S2 is increased so we reduce U2 to hold their sum constant; thus, at point AS 2 =  0.4
9we also have AU 2 =  - 0.4, sothe  endowment  levels  are S2 = 1.4, U 2 = 0.6.  Similarly  on the
vertical  axis; country  I  is  S abundant (relative to  the world) above point  0  and  U
abundant below.  While comparison of countries' endowments with those of the rest of
the world is done with reference to the 0 points on each axis, comparison of country 1
with country 2 is done with reference to the 450  line (labeled cc). Above this line country
1 is S abundant relative to country 2, while below the line it is U abundant.
The contour lines on the  figure are the country 2 welfare changes caused by
formation of the FTA with country 1.6  The lines marked 00 are the zero contour, and the
plus and minus signs indicate regions of country 2 gain and loss from FTA formation.
The welfare surface forms a saddle, with very small gains occurring along the 450  line, on
which the countries have the same relative endowments. 7
The figure illustrates first, that the gains from union between countries 1 and 2 are
largest for a country with relative factor endowment close to that of the rest of the world.
Thus,  the highest  levels of  welfare change for country 2  arise when the  country  2
endowment ratio is the same as the rest of the world's, AS 2 = -AU 2 = 0.  And second, the
gains  for this  country are largest if the country with which  it forms the FTA has a
relatively extreme endowment, well away (in either direction) from that of the rest of the
world (i.e. at the top and bottom of the figure).
The reason is as we have argued previously. If a country has endowment like that
of the rest of the world, there is little scope for trade diversion; it is doing little trade with
the rest of the world in the initial situation, so the potential amount of trade that can be
10diverted is  small.  Forming an FTA with a country with ta very;different endowment
maximizes the scope for trade creation.
The converse of this is that countries with 'extreme' endowments, well away from
that of the rest of the world, are most likely to suffer a welfare loss.  Thus, if S2 is very
low (or high) country 2 is likely to experience welfare loss, particularly if its partner is
like the rest of the world (AS, close to zero).  In the two triangle shaped regions marked
cab both countries' endowment ratios are on the same side of the world ratio, but country
2's  is further away than country l's.  Inspection of the figure indicates that these are
regions in which country 2 is relatively likely to experience welfare loss.
Convergence and divergence.
We can now address the question, does FTA membership promote convergence or
divergence of members' real incomes?  Let us suppose that country 2's  endowment is
always more extreme than country l's,  and do an experiment in which we vary their
difference from the world average.  The precise experiment is to vary endowments along
the line ee in figure 2. At all points on this line country 2 is more extreme than country 1,
but  the two countries vary from being U abundant relative to  the world to  being  S
abundant.
Figure 3 gives the welfare effects of FTA formation for this set of endowments.
Country 2 always does worse than country 1 (except at point 0 where they have the same
endowments as the rest of the world, and both experience the same gain from forming a
union).  As 1 and 2 become more different from the world average, so 2 does even worse
11- relatively and absolutely - and  1 does better; essentially, as comparative advantage
differences open up so welfare changes are magnified.
The welfare changes from forming the FTA that are reported on figures 2 and 3
can also be related to underlying welfare levels.  It will generally be the case that initial
welfare levels depend on factor endowments - so, for example, per  capita income is
higher the more physical or human capital there is per worker.  Let u suppose then that
economies that have higher endowments of S relative to U have, initially, higher per
capita income levels. 8 Starting at a point on the left of figure 3, this means that country 2
has little S relative to U, and a low initial income, relative both to country 1 and to the
rest of the world, (as summarised at the top of the figure, where Y; denotes real income,
and subscript W denotes rest of world).  Formnation  of the FTA therefore reduces the
welfare of the low income country (2), and raises welfare in the higher income country
(1). But now select a point to the right of point 0, at which country 2 is initially relatively
well endowed with S and has relatively high income: it is now the relatively high income
country (2) that loses and the lower income country (1) that gains.
What  this  shows  is  that  FTAs  between  low  income  countries  will  cause
divergence of real income, with the low income (extreme endowment) country losing.
FTAs  between high  income countries will cause convergence, with the high  income
(extreme endowment) country losing.
We have already discussed a hypothetical example of the low income case, with
our Uganda - Kenya FTA. The high income analogue might be, say France and Portugal.
If  France  is  relatively  S  abundant (so higher  income), then  it  would  be  better  off
importing its U intensive products from the rest of the world than from Portugal - which
12has a comparative advantage in such products relative to France but not relative to the
rest  of the world; the FTA causes France trade diversion.  But  for Portugal the FTA
results in an increase in imports of S intensive products from France - and the price of
these in S abundant France is less than the world price.  Thus in this high income FTA it
is the high income country which suffers trade diversion, and the low income which
experiences trade creation.
North - South  agreements
The preceding sub-section looked at a case in which both members of the FTA are
on the same side of the world average.  What if the two countries are on different sides -
a 'north-south'  FTA?  To explore this let us fix the endowment of country 2 and show
how the effects of FTA membership depends on the endowment of its partner.  In terms
of figure 2, the comparisons we make are along line ff with country 2 endowment fixed
at a moderately U abundant level (AS 2 = -0.25), and l's  varying from U abundant to S
abundant.  The welfare changes from FTA formation for this  set of endowments are
illustrated on figure 4, with country l's  factor abundance varying along the horizontal
axis.
What type of partner is best for country 2 (assumed moderately U abundant)?
From figure 4 we see that it does well with either a very U abundant or a very S abundant
partner.  What it wants to avoid is a partner that is close to the world average.
The logic behind avoiding a country similar to the world average (e.g. in  the
interval between f and 0) is as we have described before.  Country 2 has little scope for
13trade creation, but maximum scope for trade diversion as its partner comes between it and
the rest of the world.
The benefits from picking a country with even higher U abundance (to the left of
f where AS, < AS 2 =  - 0.25) is also as we have seen.  Country 2 has trade creation, since
its  partner  has  comparative  advantage quite  different  from  the  rest  of  the  world.
However, in this  'south-south'  agreement country 2's  gain is associated with a  much
worse outcome for the partner country.
The 'north-south' agreement, (AS 1 > 0), by contrast, offers gains for country 2 and
for the partner. They both benefit from liberalizing trade with a partner country that has a
very different factor endowment.  Both countries' production structures move towards
production of the good intensive in the factor with which they abundantly endowed.  This
factor abundance is now relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world, and it
is this that creates the mutual benefits.
Increasing the S abundance of the partner country (1) brings increasing gains for
country  2.9  However,  country  1's  welfare change turns  down beyond  some  point,
eventually becoming a loss.  The intuition is that once country 1 becomes extremely S
abundant, then the FTA as a whole is S abundant relative to the rest of the world.  At the
margin, country I would then do better expanding trade with the rest of the world than
within the FTA.
Pulling this together, we see a strong case for 'north-south' integration schemes.
If country 2 links with another U abundant country (AS, < 0 on figure 4) then it may gain
or lose, and any gains it makes usually come at a cost to its partner, so at least one of the
14'southern'  countries is losing.  But if it joins an FTA with an S abundant country (AS, >
0) then country 2 gains - as may its partner also.
3:  Agglomeration and cumulative causation:
Comparative advantage is not the only force that drives relocation of activity in an
FTA.  As economic centers start to develop, so 'cumulative causation' mechanisms come
into effect, leading to the spatial clustering (or agglomeration) of economic activity, and
extending the advantage of locations that have a head-start. 1 °
Spatial clustering of economic activities is  all pervasive.  Cities exist because
businesses, workers and consumers benefit by being in close proximity.  Particular types
of activity are frequently clustered, the most spectacular examples being the electronics
industries of Silicon Valley, cinema in  Hollywood, and the concentration of banking
activities in the world's financial districts. Clustering also occurs in many manufacturing
industries - for example US automobile manufacturing in the Detroit area, or industries
such as medical equipment, printing machinery and others studied by Porter (1990).
We can analyse clustering by thinking of it as the outcome of a balance between
'centripetal'  forces, encouraging firms to  locate close to  each other, and  'centrifugal'
forces, encouraging them to spread out.  We want to ask whether membership of an FTA
changes this balance, promoting concentration - or deconcentration  - of activities.  Let us
start by outlining the main centripetal and centrifugal forces.
The centripetal forces are usually classified in three groups (Marshall 1920). The
first are knowledge spillovers, or other beneficial technological externalities that make it
15attractive for firms to locate close to each other - in Marshall's phrase, "the mysteries of
the trade become no mysteries, but are, as it were, in the air.."  The second are various
labor market pooling effects, which encourage firms to  locate where they can benefit
from  readily  available labor skills  - perhaps  by  attracting skilled  labor  away  from
existing firms.  The third centripetal force arises from 'linkages'  between buyers and
sellers.  Firms will, other things being equal, want to locate where there customers are,
and customers will want to locate close to their suppliers.  These linkages are simply the
'backwards'  (demand) and  'forwards'  (supply) linkages of Hirschman (1958).  They
create a positive interdependence between the location decisions of different firms, and
this  can give  rise to  a process  of  cumulative causation, creating agglomerations  of
activity. 1"
These centripetal or agglomeration forces can operate at quite an aggregate level,
or  can be  much more narrowly focused.  For  example, aggregate demand creates  a
backwards linkage, drawing firms from all  sectors into locations with  large markets.
Some agglomeration forces affect broad classes of business activity - providing basic
industrial  labor  skills,  or  access  to  business  services  such  as  finance  and
telecommunications.  In contrast,  other forces are more spatially focussed.  Knowledge
spillovers affecting particular technologies, or the availability of highly specialized inputs
might operate at the level of a narrowly defined industry.  In this case the forces work for
clustering of the narrowly defined sector, rather than for clustering of manufacturing as a
whole.
Pulling  in  the  opposite  direction  are  'centrifugal  forces',  encouraging  the
dispersion of activity.  These include congestion, pollution, or other externalities that
16might be associated with concentrations of economic activity. Competition for immobile
factors will deter agglomeration, as the price of land and perhaps also labor is bid up in
centers of activity.  In addition, there is demand from consumers who are located outside
the centers of  activity;  dispersed consumers will encourage dispersion of producers,
particularly if trade barriers or transport costs are high.
How might the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces be upset by
membership of an FTA?  Can membership cause, or amplify, the clustering of economic
activity, and if so might it widen income differentials between partner countries?
By reducing trade barriers, membership in  an FTA makes it easier to  supply
consumers (or customers more generally) from a few locations.  This suggests that the
balance  of  forces  may  be  tipped  in  favor  of  agglomeration,  although  the  ensuing
relocation of industry could develop in several different ways.
One possibility is that particular sectors become more spatially concentrated, and
this is likely if the centripetal forces act at a quite narrow, sectoral level.  For example,
industries  in  the  US  are  much  more  spatially concentrated  than  in  Europe  (even
controlling for the distribution of population and manufacturing as a whole), suggesting
that regional integration in Europe could cause agglomeration at the sectoral level (for
example,  Germany  gets  engineering, the  UK  financial  services,  and  so  on).  The
possibility  that  this  might  happen is  generating some  concern in  Europe,  although
evidence for it is  so far  rather weak.  If  it  does happen it  will create considerable
adjustment  costs  - as  the  industrial  structure of  different  locations  changes - but
aggregate benefits, as there are real efficiency gains from spatial concentration.  This
17sectoral agglomeration need not be associated with increases in intra-RIA inequalities;
each country or region may attract activity in some sectors.
An alternative possibility is that, instead of relatively small sectors each clustering
in different locations, manufacturing as a whole comes to cluster in a few locations, de-
industrializing the less favored regions.  In this case, it is likely to lead to divergence of
the income levels of members of the FTA.  Under what circumstances might this be the
outcome? It will be relatively more likely to occur if manufacturing as a whole is a small
share of the economy.  This is because fitting the whole of manufacturing in one (or a
few) locations is then less likely to press up against factor supply constraints and lead to
rising prices of immobile factors (such as land).  It will be more likely if linkages are
broad, across many sectors, rather than narrowly sector specific.  This in turn  is more
likely in early stages of development, where a country's basic industrial infrastructure -
transport, telecommunications, access to financial markets and other business services -
is thinly  developed and unevenly spread.  And it will be  more likely to  occur with
preferential trade liberalization - an FTA - than with general import liberalization.  This
is because an FTA is inherently more inward looking, strengthening linkages between
firms in the FTA, so increasing one of the centripetal forces.
These arguments suggests that there is possibility that FTA membership could
lead to  agglomeration.  For industrialised countries this  is more likely at the sectoral
level, in which case it need not lead to divergence of per capita income levels.  But for
countries with less developed industrial sectors, it is more likely to occur at the level of
industry as a whole, in which case it will foster income divergence.
18We expect that these agglomeration forces will interact with  the comparative
advantage arguments we made in the preceding section.  In south-south FTAs they are
likely  to be reinforcing.  For example, as Nairobi, Abidjan and Dakar have attracted
manufacturing, so they have started to develop business networks and the linkages that
tend to lock manufacturing in to the location.  The process might be further accelerated
by  the propensity of foreign direct investment to  cluster in relatively  few locations.
Agglomeration then accentuates the comparative advantage forces for divergence.  In
'north-south'  FTAs that span a wide range of factor endowment ratios, the forces may
pull in opposite directions.  For example, firms choosing locations in Europe may want
the agglomeration benefits of locating in France, but factor price differences create an
incentive for them to locate in Portugal.
4:  Concluding comments
The analysis contained in this paper has not covered all the forces that might drive
convergence or divergence of income levels between member countries of an FTA, and in
'north-south'  FTAs in particular additional forces for convergence are likely to operate.
For example, a country may be able to use the agreement as a commitment mechanism to
lock in economic reforms.  This seems to have happened in Mexico with NAFTA, and in
the agreements between the European Union and East European economies.  An FTA
may also promote technology transfer from the high income country to  lower income
members.  Although the mechanisms of technology transfer are not fully understood an
important body of work argues that it is promoted by trade flows. For example, Coe and
Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997), construct an index of total
19knowledge capital in each industrial country, and assume that trading partners get access
to a country's  stock of knowledge in proportion to their imports from that country.  They
find that access to foreign knowledge is a statistically significant determinant of the rate
of total factor productivity across OECD and developing countries.' 2 Thus an FTA might
promote technology transfer via its effect on trade.  Similarly, FTAs typically promote
foreign  direct  investment,  another  likely  source  of  technology  transfer.  These
considerations probably reinforce the argument that a  'north-south'  FTA may promote
convergence of income levels.
What we have shown in this paper is that the distribution of the benefits of an
FTA  can  be  linked  directly to  the  comparative advantage  of  member  countries  -
comparative advantage relative to each other and to the rest of the world.  This leads to
the strong result that FTAs between low income countries will tend to cause divergence
of  their  income  levels,  whereas  FTAs  between  high  income  levels  will  lead  to
convergence. We have argued that agglomeration forces might amplify divergence forces
in FTAs between low income countries.  The analysis suggests that developing countries
are likely to gain more from FTAs with high income countries, where there are better
prospects for convergence with the other - high income - members.
20Endnotes:
There is a large literature on sufficient conditions, typically in terms of changes in
endogenous variables. For a survey see Baldwin and Venables (1995).
2  Differences measured by the standard deviation across countries of log per capita
incomes.
3  We use the average of France, Germany, Italy and the UK.
4  This price is determined by the equality of supply and demand within the customs
union.
5  This fixes the units of measurement for the two factors.
6  Welfare is measured as the utility of a single representative consumer.
7  The welfare gain on line cc arises only because of the Armington assumption and the
small amount of product differentiation we have introduced.
8  Factor endowments are both inputs to production and sources of household income.
Once a an ownership structure of factors is specified, changes in the ratio of S to U
will generally change household income. Providing such a change is monotonic the
argument of the text goes through.
9  Until quite extreme levels, at which point countries have moved to the edge of their
cones of diversification
This section is based on Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) and Puga and
Venables (1998).
"  This argument only works if there are increasing returns to scale in production.  (If
not, firms can put small plants in many different locations). For forrnal analysis see
Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
12  The conclusion has been challenged because the paper assumes, rather than tests, that
imports from industrial countries provide the correct weights with which to combine
stocks of foreign knowledge. Keller (1998) has suggested that the results are little
better than would be obtained from relating TFP to a random weighting of foreign
knowledge stocks.
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